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 Chapter 13 
 How Will We Know? The Case 
for Opportunity Indicators 
 Richard  V.  Reeves 
 Abstract  While the U.S. is a world leader in opportunity rhetoric, it is something 
of a laggard for opportunity metrics. Indicators are necessary to guide policy, drive 
data collection strategies, and measure progress. We need clear concepts and cred-
ible indicators of opportunity to have an idea of whether we have “restored” it or if 
we are even headed in the right direction. Right now, indicators are the poor relation 
of the policy-making process, lacking either the immediacy of strong rhetoric or the 
tangibility of policies and programs. Indicators are the missing link in our attempts 
to promote equal opportunity, which is unavoidably an American vision of fairness. 
This chapter argues for a defi nition of opportunity based on intergenerational rela-
tive mobility and describes current levels of mobility, as well as the relationships 
between mobility patterns and family structure, education, and race. It also provides 
a brief history of the social indicators movement in the U.S. and outlines some of 
the theoretical terrain of indicator development. The chapter goes on to describe two 
current examples of indicator frameworks—from the United Kingdom and 
Colorado. Finally, it proposes four specifi c reforms to elevate the role of indicators 
in the promotion of opportunity: setting a long-term Goal for Intergenerational 
Mobility; a “dashboard” of Annual Opportunity Indicators; an American Opportunity 
Survey; and a Federal Offi ce of Opportunity. 
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 Introduction 
 The  rhetorical attraction of opportunity is irresistible. Every politician in the land 
sings its praises, laments its absence, or promises its restoration. Opportunity is a 
leitmotif not only of American political discourse but of American culture: Horatio 
Alger, the frontier, the land of opportunity, the  American Dream … you know the 
drill. 
 Take these two quotes—one from  President Obama, a Democrat: “Opportunity 
is who we are … but upward mobility has stalled”—and the other from 
U.S. Representative  Paul Ryan , a Republican and now Speaker of the House: 
“Upward mobility is the central promise of life in America, but right now, America’s 
engines of upward mobility aren’t working the way they should.” 
 Rhetorical agreement that America ought to be a land of opportunity is, of 
course, hardly news. But it is signifi cant that most senior political fi gures now agree 
that we are falling far short of this ideal. Mounting empirical evidence that rates of 
intergenerational social mobility in the U.S. are low and fl at has fi nally penetrated 
the American political consciousness. A chance for some bipartisan work to address 
social mobility has presented itself, a precious moment that ought to be seized. 
 But while the U.S. is a world leader in opportunity rhetoric, it is something of a 
laggard for opportunity metrics. Indicators are necessary to guide policy, drive data 
collection strategies, and measure progress. There are clear summary statistics of 
economic growth, poverty, and productivity, Why not opportunity? We need clear 
concepts and credible indicators of opportunity to have an idea of whether we are 
even headed in the right direction. Right now, indicators are the poor relation of the 
social policy world, lacking either the immediacy of strong rhetoric or the tangibil-
ity of policies and programs. Indicators are the missing link in our attempts to pro-
mote opportunity. 
 Indicators can act as the point of contact between goals, initiatives, and data. 
First, of course, the overall goal has to be established and given a clear conceptual 
basis. Then indicators can be drawn together or developed to show long-run prog-
ress toward that goal. In addition, shorter-term “leading indicators” can also be 
defi ned. Initiatives—a deliberately broad term encompassing government policies 
and programs, but also work by nongovernmental organizations or even corpora-
tions—can then be judged against these indicators. 
 Evidence-based policy is obviously preferable to what we often get, which is 
policy-based evidence making. But evidence  of what is the important question—to 
which indicators provide an answer. Last but not least, the generation of indicators 
can shape and promote new approaches to data collection. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I will:
 (a)  Position  equal opportunity as the unavoidably American vision of fairness; 
 (b)  Argue for a defi nition of opportunity based on  intergenerational relative 
mobility ; 
 (c)  Describe current levels of mobility, and the relationships between mobility pat-
terns and  family structure , education, and race; 
R.V. Reeves
445
 (d)  Provide a brief history of the  social indicators movement in the U.S.; 
 (e)  Outline some of the theoretical terrain of indicator development; 
  (f)  Describe two current examples of indicator frameworks—from the  United 
Kingdom and  Colorado —and; 
 (g)  Propose four specifi c reforms to elevate the role of indicators in the promotion 
of opportunity: setting a long-term Goal for Intergenerational Mobility; a 
“dashboard” of Annual Opportunity Indicators; an American Opportunity 
Survey; and a Federal Offi ce of Opportunity. 
 All-American: Equal Opportunity as Egalitarian 
Individualism 
 The volume in your hands (or perhaps, more likely on your screen) is one of thou-
sands with the word “opportunity” in its title. Especially in America, opportunity is 
a term redolent of optimism, progress, and freedom. It is, in short, impossible to be 
against. The danger is that opportunity becomes a protean term, meaning almost 
anything, or something different to different people in different contexts. Some 
specifi city is therefore required in order to move beyond rhetoric and into action. 
 I will shortly argue for a specifi c concept of opportunity, namely relative  inter-
generational income mobility . But fi rst I will attempt to defi ne equal opportunity as 
a distinctly American kind of fairness. In his second inaugural address in 2013, 
Obama declared: “We are true to our creed when a little girl born into the bleakest 
poverty knows that she has the same chance to succeed as anybody else, because she 
is an American; she is free, and she is equal, not just in the eyes of God but also in 
our own.” 
 So: the “same chance to succeed,” even though “born into the bleakest poverty.” 
This is the utopian ideal of American fairness, in which the  inequalities of birth do 
not dictate the  inequalities of life . While Obama, like most politicians, focused on 
upward mobility out of poverty, the equal opportunity ideal reaches all the way up 
the distribution. It is about the chance for a middle class kid to join the elite, as well 
as for a poor kid to join the middle class. The ideal also goes deeper than political 
rhetoric. Equality of opportunity is in America’s DNA. The moral claim that each 
individual has the right to succeed is even implicit in the proclamation of Declaration 
of Independence that “All men are created equal.” In his fi rst draft of that historic 
document,  Thomas Jefferson in fact wrote that all were created “equal and indepen-
dent.” This is the distinctly American formula—equality plus independence adds up 
to the promise of upward mobility. Equal opportunity reconciles individual liberty—
the freedom to get ahead and “make something of yourself”—with societal equality. 
It is how the ideal of natural equality—“born equal” is fused with the ideal of indi-
vidualism—“born independent.” It is a philosophy of egalitarian individualism. 1 
1  I expand on this argument in my Brookings essay  Saving Horatio Alger (2014). See  http://www.
brookings.edu/research/essays/2014/saving-horatio-alger . 
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 Chris Hayes writes of social mobility in his book  Twilight of the Elites : “Those 
on the bottom who make it to the top rise from their class rather than with it. It is a 
fundamentally individualistic model of achievement” (Hayes  2013 , 23). Hayes 
wishes it could be different. But that is wishful thinking. Individualism is hard- 
wired into the very idea of America. The challenge is to ensure that it is genuinely 
combined with equality of opportunity. Hayes laments, “[T]he meritocratic creed 
fi nds purchase on both the left and the right because it draws from each…. It is 
‘liberal’ in the classical sense.” Indeed it is—just like America. 
 Opportunity Equals Intergenerational Relative Mobility 
 Even the term “equality of opportunity” is, of course, very broad. The philosopher 
Bertrand Russell, asked what he actually did all day, replied: “[Y]ou clarify a few 
concepts, make a few distinctions. It’s a living.” Concepts and distinctions will be 
important, too, for the motivating project of this volume. We have to be crystal clear 
what we mean when we talk or write about “opportunity” and equally clear about 
the distinctions being made between different variants.  Amartya Sen , the Nobel 
Prize-winning economist, famously argued that because everyone favors equality of 
one sort or another, the key question is: “Equality of what?” (Sen  1979 , 1). So, in 
the spirit of Sen, what do we mean by “equality of opportunity?” 
 In particular, is our main concern with  absolute mobility or  relative mobility ? 
Relative mobility is, as  Scott Winship puts it, “a measure of how the ranking of 
adults against their peers is (or is not) tied to the ranking of their parents against 
their peers. That is to say, ignoring dollar amounts, did adults who rank high or low 
in the income distribution also have parents who ranked high or low?” (Economic 
Policies for the 21st Century  2014 ). By contrast, absolute mobility rates are all 
about dollar amounts. In Winship’s terms: “absolute mobility ignores rankings and 
simply considers whether adults tend to have higher, size-adjusted incomes than 
their parents did at the same age, after taking into account increases in the cost of 
living.” 
 Most people are upwardly mobile in the absolute sense: 84 % of U.S. adults, 
according to the latest estimates (Economic Mobility Project  2012 ). People raised 
in families toward the bottom of the income distribution are the most likely to over-
take their parents’ income status, as Fig.  13.1 shows. It is hard, then, from an abso-
lute basis, to see that the “engines” of upward mobility have “stalled.”
 The two key drivers of absolute mobility are the rates of  economic growth and 
the distribution of that growth. Policy should therefore attempt to maximize real 
income growth for as wide a swath of the population as possible. Relative mobility, 
which tracks movement up and down the income ladder, captures a different idea of 
fairness, closer to the ideal of  meritocracy . Which kind of mobility to focus on—or 
rather, what balance to strike between the two—is a normative, rather than empiri-
cal, question. But relative mobility gets closer to the ideal of “ equality of opportu-
nity.” Even if everyone is richer than his or her parents, we would be a deeply unfair 
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society if everyone was also stuck on exactly the same point on the income ladder. 
We want growth and more prosperity, but we also want fl uidity and more fairness. 
A common way to present this intergenerational relative mobility is to examine the 
relationship between the income quintile (one-fi fth of the income distribution) that 
people end up in as adults compared to the quintile they were born or raised in. 
Alternative approaches include a measure of the correlation between the income 
rank of parents and their child, used in particular by  Raj Chetty , and rank direction 
mobility (RDM), which tracks an individual’s position on the whole income rank 
compared to their parents’ rank—developed in particular by  Bhashkar Mazumder 
(Mazumder  2011 ,  2014 ). 
 Three more questions of defi nition should be briefl y addressed. First, there is an 
important distinction to be made between  inter generational and  intra generational 
mobility , which is a measure of how far individuals will move up and down the 
income ladder during their own lifetime, especially during the prime working age 
years. While these kinds of mobility are related, my primary focus is on the 
former. 
 Second, the choice of outcome is important. Most studies of mobility focus on 
income. But there are, of course, many other possibilities, including wages, educa-
tion, well-being, and occupational status. Many of these will provide important 
information about the capabilities and opportunities enjoyed by individuals, but I 
focus here on income. Income is important in itself and is strongly correlated with 
other goods. It is also a yardstick that is reasonably easy to measure and compare 
over time 
 Third, the presumption underlying this approach to measuring equal opportunity 
presumes that an outcome—in this case of income—is a good enough proxy for 
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 Fig. 13.1  Absolute mobility: share of Americans who exceed their parents’ family income 
(Copyright © July 2012 The Pew Charitable Trusts) 
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between an opportunity being available and somebody seizing it (Swift  2004 ). But 
for the moment, patterns of outcomes appear to suffi ce as an accurate refl ection of 
patterns of opportunities. 
 Mobility: The Current Picture 
 The current picture in terms of  relative intergenerational income mobility (RIIM) is 
not the main focus of this chapter (see Chap.  8 ). But a brief overview will provide a 
context for my broader argument on the need for strong indicators to guide data col-
lection strategies, policy development, and evaluation. 
 The top line is: Rates of RIIM in the U.S. are low and fl at and vary signifi cantly 
by family structure, education, race, and geography. The U.S. suffers from a high 
degree of intergenerational income “stickiness,” especially at the top and bottom of 
the income distribution as Fig.  13.2 , using the dataset constructed from the  National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the  Social Genome Model , shows. There 
is more than a twofold difference in the odds of a child born in the top quintile 
remaining in the top income quintiles (the “comfortable middle class”), compared 
to one born in the bottom quintile (56 % versus 23 %).
 Has this picture worsened over time? It seems not. In a comprehensive series of 
recent studies, making innovative use of administrative records of income, Chetty 
et al. ( 2014 , 10) investigate geographical variations in mobility (see below) and 
long-term trends. Their conclusion: “children entering the labor market today have 
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the same chances of moving up in the income distribution relative to their parents as 
children born in the 1970s.” 
 There are, however, stark differences in mobility patterns at different levels of 
education. Children with a college degree are more likely to be upwardly mobile. A 
comparison of Figs.  13.3 and  13.4 shows that among children raised in the poorest 
quintile, those with a college degree are 20 times more likely than their high school 
dropout counterparts to make it to the top (20 % versus 1 %).
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 Fig. 13.4  Social mobility matrix: less than high school education 
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 Even top-income children receive a boost by receiving a college degree—37 % 
of them stay at the top, far more than their  high school dropout and  graduate peers, 
as seen in Fig.  13.3 . So college degrees can be a double-edged sword in terms of 
relative mobility, helping improve the economic situation of poor children who go 
on to get a  bachelor’s degree but also preserving the economic situation of the 
affl uent. 
 At the other end of the spectrum, failing to receive a high school diploma dam-
ages upward mobility rates. Bottom-income children without a diploma have a 
54 % probability of remaining on the bottom rung as adults, as seen in Fig.  13.4 . 
Rates of downward mobility from the middle three quintiles are also very high for 
those without a diploma (42 % at the second quintile, 37 % at the third, and 48 % at 
the fourth). 
 There are striking differences in mobility by race, especially between  Black 
Americans (Fig.  13.5 ) and  White Americans (Fig.  13.6 ). One in two Black children 
born into the bottom quintile will remain there in adulthood, compared to just one 
in four Whites, and only 3 % of Black children rise to the top income quintile. Also, 
Black children are more likely to be downwardly mobile from the middle: of Black 
children born to parents in the middle-income quintile, 69 % move downward.
 There are also big differences in terms of the mobility patterns of children born 
in different kinds. As shown in Fig.  13.7 , children with  never- married mothers face 
a roughly 50–50 chance of remaining in the bottom quintile, while as Fig.  13.8 
shows, children raised by continuously married parents have high upward mobility 
rates. The two biggest factors behind the “ marriage effect ” appear to be higher 
income, even within income quintiles, and more engaged parenting (Reeves and 
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 Last, there are variations in mobility patterns by geography. Chetty et al. ( 2014 , 
26) estimate, for example, that “the probability that a child from the lowest quintile 
of parental income rises to the top quintile is 10.8 % in Salt Lake City (Utah), com-
pared with 4.4 % in Charlotte (North Carolina).” Five factors correlate strongly with 
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 Fig. 13.7  Social mobility matrix: children of never-married mothers. Note: Sample size too small 
for those born in top two quintiles 
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intergenerational mobility by geography: racial and economic segregation, school 
quality, income inequality, social capital, and family structure, together “explain-
ing” 76 % of the variation in upward mobility. 
 This brief discussion of the shape of U.S. intergenerational mobility is intended 
to motivate the remainder of this chapter, which focuses on the role of indicators to 
frame and focus strategies to promote greater opportunity. I begin with a brief his-
tory of social indicators and an even briefer theoretical overview. 
 A Very Brief History of Social Indicators 
 The U.S. has had an on-off relationship with social indicators. Interest began with 
the 19 th century temperance movement, when campaigners began to collect data 
showing the deleterious social effects of alcohol. The alcohol industry responded 
with data on how much employment and revenue it generated: The result was a 
loosely fact-based debate about alcohol in the 1830s. But the measurements of 
trends began in earnest with the establishment of the Massachusetts Bureau of 
Statistics of Labor in 1869. But it was far from objective. First, it was run by pro-
union offi cials, leading to biased reports; then it was taken over by pro-business 
staffi ng and swung the other way. But it was nonetheless an attempt to give data 
some offi cial grounding and status. 
 The  Community Indicators Movement was kick-started by the Pittsburgh Study 
funded by the Russell Sage Foundation in 1910, which inspired similar studies in 
towns around the U.S., with measures of health, income, jobs and so on. This was a 
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time of great optimism about the potential of social indicators to effect change, as 
Cohen writes: “They relayed the fi ndings of the technical experts to the public, who, 
enlightened by the facts, were expected to mobilize public opinion and press for 
appropriate reforms” (Cohen, quoted in Cobb and Rixford  1998 , 7). The idea was 
that facts could change the world, through a process of enlightenment. In 1933, 
 Recent Social Trends was published, under the Hoover administration. At 1,500 
pages long, it was a compendium of every piece of social data the authors could get 
hold of. It also had no impact. The burst of interest in the 1930s did help to create 
the conditions for a signifi cant widening in the collection of data on social trends. 
The  U.S. Census Bureau , in particular, has captured increasingly rich data on demo-
graphic and social trends, especially through the  Current Population Survey , which 
replaced the Monthly Report on the Labor Force in 1948. 
 Social indicators were out of political fashion until the late 1960s and early 
1970s when a series of major studies were undertaken, including  Indicators of 
Social Change (Sheldon and Moore  1968 ) and  Towards a Social Report (HEW 
 1969 ). Across a range of policy areas, including defense, there was a renewed 
emphasis on the role of indicators in supporting cost-benefi t analysis. This helps to 
explain why a good deal of funding was provided by NASA, which wanted to look 
at the impact of the space program on American society. (Many reviews of this work 
said that the links between the space program and the social indicators work were 
“somewhat tenuous,” which seems kind.) 
 The  Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB) and Census Bureau picked up the 
baton, issuing a series of  Social Indicators reports in the 1970s and into the 1980s 
( U.S. Offi ce of Management and Budget 1974 ; U.S. Bureau of the Census  1977 , 
 1981 ). A Center for the Coordination on Social Indicators was established in 1972. 
Between 1967 and 1973, Senator  Walter Mondale submitted a number of bills to 
create a Council of Social Advisers (to mirror the Council of Economic Advisers) 
and institutionalize an annual social indicators report. 
 The movement was largely halted during the Nixon administration, as the role of 
social indicators lost any normative force. As  Clifford Cobb and Craig Rixford 
write: “Some had envisioned these as the beginning of institutionalized social 
reporting, but their hopes were quickly dashed as political pressure within the  Nixon 
Administration turned them into  neutral chartbooks, replete with facts but void of 
interpretation … the social indicators movement in the United States was effec-
tively over by the early 1980s” (Ibid., 11, my emphasis). 
 At the same time, many international organizations, such as the  Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development , the United Nations, and the European 
Union started to get very interested in social indicators, and in the 1990s, surveys 
and indices of well-being began to gain some traction, partly inspired by the 
 environmental movement. In more recent years in the U.S., there has been a modest 
renaissance of community indicators, led by the  Community Indicators Consortium , 
 Healthy Cities movement , and so on. In one sense, this takes us back a century to 
where Russell Sage started in 1910, with metro-based approaches to community 
indicators rather than at a national or federal level. Efforts to improve the quality 
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and increase the salience of indicators at the national level have been led by the 
National Academy of Science under its Key National Indicator Initiative, resulting 
in a series of publications, notably an important 2012 report,  Using Science as 
Evidence in Public Policy (Prewitt et al.  2012 ). In 2010, President Obama signed 
legislation intended to create a  Key National Indicators System , following advice 
from a commission of experts. A budget of $70 million was set aside. The commis-
sion was appointed in 2010 but never convened. The money—which was included 
in a provision of the Affordable Care Act—was never appropriated. 
 Theory: Conceptual Issues 
 The selection of indicators is not a straightforward matter. Indicators come in a 
wide variety of forms. Borrowing heavily from Cobb and Rixford (Ibid.), indica-
tors can be distinguished and defi ned on a number of axes: inductive or deductive; 
“pseudo- objective” or “partisan”; descriptive or prescriptive; “local” or national; 
broad or narrow; and indirect or direct. The choice of indicator is inescapably 
connected to the purpose of the indicator—this is why they can only even be 
“pseudo” objective. Indicators of progress toward greater social mobility ought to 
be deductive (based on a clear theory about what promotes and predicts mobility); 
as objective as possible; prescriptive (intended to guide policy); narrow (provide 
as much focus as possible); and direct (getting as close as possible to the causal 
connection to mobility). But in terms of the choice between national and subna-
tional indicators, the answer can legitimately be “both.” Many leading indicators 
may work in most localities. But especially in a nation as large and diverse as the 
U.S., there may be some localities in which a particular indicator is more power-
ful than elsewhere. 
 In their review of the role of indicators, Cobb and Rixford (Ibid.) offer a number 
of important lessons, of which I would highlight the following:
 (a)  A clear conceptual basis is needed for indicators—otherwise you end up with a 
forest of numbers but no path; 
 (b)  A number is not necessarily a good indicator—just because a number is avail-
able does not mean it is “getting at” the trend or factor you are interested in; 
 (c)  There is no such thing as a “value-free” indicator—the simple selection of a 
particular indicator is a value judgment. It is better to be clear and upfront about 
the purpose of the indicator; 
 (d)  Comprehensiveness is the enemy of effectiveness—fi ve strong indicators are 
better than 105 indicators in terms of focusing political energy; and 
 (e)  Indicators should attempt to reveal causes, not symptoms—especially in terms 
of promoting social mobility, indicators that get close to causal relationships are 
the most valuable. 
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 Indicators and the U.K.’s Social Mobility Strategy 
 I served in the U.K. Coalition Government from 2010 to 2012, as Director of 
Strategy to the Deputy Prime Minister, who was leader of the junior party, the 
Liberal Democrats. At the time, Prime Minister  David Cameron was in favor of 
what he had labeled the “big society”—a deliberate contrast to both the idea of the 
“big state” and  Margaret Thatcher’s claim that there “is no such thing as society.” 
But Cameron and his team refused to defi ne their term clearly or apply any metrics. 
So my questions to them were always along the following lines: “How will you 
know when society is bigger? How big is it now? What are your measures?” In the 
end they stopped inviting me to the meetings. But the truth is they had no way to 
answer the questions. The “big society” was just a rhetorical device. 
 Of course “opportunity” is at least as nebulous a term as “big society.” But when 
the U.K. government made a strong commitment to promoting social mobility as its 
overarching social policy goal, that commitment was buttressed by indicators and 
institutions. In April 2011, the U.K. government issued a social mobility strategy, 
declaring: “A fair society is an open society, one in which every individual is free to 
succeed. That is why improving social mobility is the principal goal of the 
Government’s social policy” (Cabinet Offi ce, HM Government  2012 , 5). 
 The defi nition of social mobility guiding the U.K. efforts is fairly tight, with a 
declared focus on intergenerational relative mobility by both income and occupa-
tion. Deciding on this defi nition was a vitally important step, laying the foundations 
for the selection of key “leading indicators” that are—based on the best available 
evidence—predictive of long-term trends in mobility. These indicators are shown in 
Table  13.1 and include income gaps in  low birth weight ,  school readiness ,  educa-
tional attainment at ages 11, 16, and 19,  postsecondary education , access to the 
professions, and early-career wage progression. An independent analysis of the 
indicators suggests that together they should capture more than half of the likely 
trends in intergenerational mobility (Gregg et al.  2014 ). The U.K. government also 
took steps to institutionalize the social mobility commitment with the creation of a 
Cabinet committee and a new, independent statutory Commission on Social 
Mobility and Child Poverty that reports annually to Parliament and the 
administration.
 Indicators and the Colorado Opportunity Project 
 The State of Colorado has also created an evidence-based indicator framework for 
opportunity, based in part on the Social Genome Model (Winship and Owen  2013 ). 
The overall goal is to help as many Colorado residents as possible become “middle 
class by middle age” (i.e., a household income of 300 % of the federal poverty line 
by age 40). Following a yearlong project involving multiple state agencies and key 
stakeholders, a series of indicators at key life stages have been developed, as shown 
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in Table  13.2 . These indicators, making use of data available at a state level, will be 
used to help identify the most effective programs and initiatives. The project is still 
evolving, but speaking at a stakeholder summit on the project in March 2015, Gov. 
 John Hickenlooper set the bar high: “The  Colorado Opportunity Project is going to 
make history.”
 The U.K. and Colorado are just two examples of the operationalization of oppor-
tunity goals and indicators: They are offered here not as defi nitive or comprehensive 
but as illustrations of the potential for such an approach of which I have fi rsthand 
knowledge. Are there any lessons here for the U.S. more broadly? 




Low birth weight (disadvantage gap) DH
2. Child 
development
Child development at age 2½ (measure still under development) DH
Gap in school readiness at age 5 DfE
3. School 
attainment
Attainment of Level 4 at KS2 (FSM gap) DfE
Attainment of “the basics” at GCSE (FSM gap) DfE
Attainment of “the basics” at GCSE (deprived school gap) DfE





18−24 year olds participating in (full or part-time) education or training 
(disadvantage gap)
BIS





Percentage achieving a level 3 qualification by age 19 (FSM gap) DfE
6. Higher 
education
Progression of pupils aged 15 to HE at age 19 (FSM gap) BIS
Progression of pupils to the 33% most selective HE institutions
(state/independent school gap)
BIS




Access to the professions (disadvantage gap) BIS/DWP
Progression in the labour market (wage progression) BIS/DWP
Second chances in the labour market (post-19 basic skills) BIS/DWP
 Abbreviations:  BIS Department for Business, Innovation & Skills,  DfE Department for Education, 
 DH Department of Health;  DWP Department for Work and Pensions,  FSM free school meals, 
 GCSE General Certifi cate of Secondary Education,  HE Higher Education 
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 Table 13.2  The Colorado opportunity framework  






Born at a normal birth weight,
to a non-poor, married mother
with at least a high school
diploma
Rate of low birth weight
Increasing the 
proportion




Feeling down, depressed, or sad (maternal
depression)
circumstances –
who are middle 
class by middle age
Single or dual household parenting
(Family Income of 
300%
Unintended pregnancy (intendedness vs
unintendedness)
FPL or higher at 
age 40)
Early childhood  (0-5)
Acceptable pre-reading and 
math skills AND behavior
generally socially appropriate
% of parents with concerns about child's 
emotions, concentration, behavior or 
ability to get along with others (ages 0-8)
% of families relying on low cost food
(ages 0-8 )
Children ages 1 to 5 whose family
members read to them less than 3 days per
week [SCHOOL READINESS]
Middle childhood (5-12)
Basic reading and math skills 
AND social-emotional skills
Standardized test math scores
Standardized test reading scores
% of parents with concerns about child's
emotions, concentration, behavior or 
ability to get along with others ( 9-14)
Adolescence  (12–19)
Graduates from high school 
with a GPA > 2.5 AND has not 
been convicted of a crime nor 
become a parent
High school graduation status (on time or 
not)
Juvenile property and crime data (violent 
arrest rate and property arrest rate)
Became a teen parent?
% of 6th-8th and 9th-12th grade students 
who report ever feeling so sad or hopeless;
% of 6th-8th and 9th-12th grade students 
who have considered suicide;
% of young adults ages 18-25 who are 
currently depressed
(continued)
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 Opportunity Indicators for the U.S.: Four Proposals 
 Indicators can provide a powerful infrastructure for policy making. This is an estab-
lished fact in economics but has yet to become so for social policy. The current 
bipartisan interest in opportunity and mobility, however, could allow for operation-
alization of key indicators of progress, with potentially long-term benefi ts. In par-
ticular, four reforms should be considered. 
 Invest in Data for Opportunity 
 Data is gold, especially in the fi eld of opportunity. Without data, policy decisions 
are arbitrary, claims are untested, and progress is virtually impossible. Indicators 
amount, in policy terms, to a weaponized data point. But the data they are based on 
has to be good. 
 This is an area where the U.S. can do much, much better, especially given the 
national commitment to opportunity. There are some hopeful signs of bipartisan 
activity here, too. House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) and Sen.  Patty Murray (D-WA) 
are together pushing for the creation of an independent Evidence-Based 
Policymaking Commission to “expand the use of data to evaluate the effectiveness 
of federal programs and tax expenditures.” In particular, the commission, if approved 
by Congress and the President, will:
 (a)  study the federal government’s data inventory, data infrastructure, and statisti-




Lives independently AND 
receives a college degree or 
has a family income of > 250% 
of the federal poverty level
Employed status of population (by race,
sex and age -16-19)
% FPL/ Family income 
Attending post-secondary training or
education
Average number of days poor physical or 
mental health prevented usual activities, 
such as self-care, work, or recreation
Adulthood (29–40)
Reaches Middle Class (300 % 
FPL)
Average number of days poor physical or 
mental health prevented usual activities, 
such as self-care, work, or recreation
% FPL/ Family income at age 29
Employment status of the population (by 
education level age 25+)
Table 13.2 (continued)
 Abbreviation:  FPL federal poverty level 
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 (b)  make recommendations on how best to incorporate outcomes measurement, 
institutionalize randomized controlled trials, and rigorous impact analysis into 
program design; and 
 (c)  explore how to create a clearinghouse of program and survey data. 
 This may not sound very exciting to most people (it is intended not to, so as to 
avoid stoking unfounded fears about individual privacy). But it is thrilling for pol-
icy. The Obama administration has also led a renewed charge for evidence-based 
policy, as recounted by my colleague Ron Haskins ( 2015 ) in his book  Show Me the 
Evidence: Obama’s Fight for Rigor and Results in Social Policy . 
 There is, however, a basic data issue too. Progress in terms of understanding 
trends in and prospects for intergenerational mobility is limited by what  Kenneth 
(Prewitt ( 2015 ), 272), former director of  t he Census Bureau, describes as “a serious 
gap in the nation’s statistics.” One promising proposal is the creation of an American 
Opportunity Survey by linking together various administrative datasets, including 
the Census, American Community Survey, Survey of Income and Program 
Participation, as well as data from the IRS and Social Security Administration. As 
Grusky et al. ( 2015 ) argue, this approach would “provide a high-quality infrastruc-
ture for monitoring mobility without the cost of mounting a new mobility survey.” 
 Right now, as they point out, the technical infrastructure for measuring mobility 
in the U.S. is in disrepair. This makes the formulation of policy diffi cult: It is rather 
like, as they put it, “formulating monetary and labor market policy without knowing 
whether unemployment is increasing or decreasing.” 
 Getting better data is not a huge undertaking. The key is to be clear what the data is 
for. As  Isabel Sawhill put it in  1969 : “The principal barrier to quantifi cation, in the 
long run at least, is  not a lack of meaningful data but a failure to defi ne what is 
meaningful … to give operational content to our ideals.” 
 Set a Long-Term Goal for Intergenerational Mobility 
 Indicators are most valuable when an overall goal has been established: in other 
words, when it is clear what they are indicating toward. Goals can act as powerful 
policy commitment devices, helping to sustain a consistent focus on long-term 
objectives (Reeves  2015 ). In terms of promoting or restoring opportunity, a high- 
profi le bipartisan commitment to a long-term goal could galvanize action on a num-
ber of important fronts. Such a goal would sit alongside existing goals for economic 
growth, monetary policy, employment, education, health, and so on. Because 
upward relative mobility is the primary concern for most policy makers, the goal 
should relate to progress on that front. For the purposes of illustration, I propose the 
following goal: increase the proportion of people born in the bottom income quintile 
who make it to the middle quintile or higher. 
 Right now, that number lies at around 40 % (or less, according to numbers gener-
ated by the Panel Study of Income Dynamics). In a perfectly mobile society, it 
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would be 60 %. So, without further justifi cation, 50 % seems like a reasonable goal. 
There are, of course, a host of other possibilities. A weakness of this goal is that it 
focuses attention on mobility from one specifi c part of the income distribution—the 
bottom—whereas equal opportunity ought to apply all the way up. I offer the goal 
principally in order to generate debate and illustrate the point. But this headline goal 
does have the advantage of being noncontroversial (at any rate it is hard to see why 
somebody would oppose it); simple (even if tracking it would be highly technical 
and controversial); and proximate to the goal of greater relative mobility. 
Operationalizing a goal like this would, needless to say, require a considerable 
 number of technical specifi cations, including (but not restricted to): choice of data-
set; household size equivalence; income defi nition; and infl ation adjustments. 
 While the headline goal would apply to the whole population, it could also be 
used to track progress toward closing opportunity gaps and thereby help to focus 
policy attention. For example, the proportion of Black and White individuals could 
be compared in terms of the overall goal. Data from the NLSY suggests that the 
proportion of Black Americans making the journey is 22 %, compared to 58 % for 
Whites. 
 The key point is that the overall goal would act as a “north star,” guiding the direc-
tion of policy and other activities. We would at least be able to see, over the longer 
term, if we were making progress. A vitally important caveat, however: Setting such 
a goal should not precede the establishment of reliable data from which to measure 
it (see the fi rst proposal above). Of course, there are other strong candidates for a 
“north star” summary goal, including an improvement in rank-rank mobility (the 
association between parents’ rank in earnings as compared to that of their children’s 
rank as adults), or in occupational mobility, or perhaps in relation to another nation, 
such as Canada. Each approach will have strengths and weaknesses; each will fail 
to capture some dimensions of opportunity. But these concerns apply to almost all 
summary statistics, including those for GDP growth, productivity, and poverty. 
 Develop a ‘Dashboard’ of Annual Opportunity Indicators 
 It takes a  generation  to track intergenerational mobility: an obvious point, but an 
important one. It will also be valuable to develop “leading indicators” that can be 
tracked over a much shorter time horizon but are empirically proven to predict prog-
ress against the long-term goal. This is the approach taken in the Social Genome 
Model, where progress toward the long-term goal—“middle class by middle age”—
is measured and predicted by a series of success measures for each crucial life stage. 
It is also a central part of both the U.K. and Colorado examples described earlier. A 
dashboard should contain shorter-term data points and trends that—based on the 
best available evidence—will likely lead to more upward mobility in the long run. 
As in the U.K. and Colorado, these leading indicators would be best organized 
around key life stages. The indicators should also emphasize the relative picture, 
rather than the absolute one: in other words, not just overall rates for each indicator, 
but the gap between different groups. Increasing college graduation rates will not 
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improve mobility rates if most of the increase is made up of students from affl uent 
backgrounds. For relative mobility, then, the mantra is always: mind the gap. The 
particular gap ought to be determined in large part by the long-term goal. So if the 
agreed focus was indeed on movement from the bottom quintile, the most appropri-
ate short-term indicators for the annual dashboard should compare, say, rates of low 
birth weight births, school readiness, test scores, or postsecondary education 
between those in the bottom income quintile and those in the top two quintiles. 
 The point here is not to argue for specifi c elements of a dashboard—that will 
require a good deal of investigation—but for its creation. It should also be stressed 
that many of the indicators become valuable over time, with repeated measurement 
and reporting, rather than as snapshots at a particular moment in time. 
 For the purposes of illustration, Table  13.3 combines the indicators used in the 
U.K., Colorado, the Social Genome Model, and my own paper on “fi ve strong 
starts.” The overlaps are clear. The opportunity dashboard should have as many 
indicators as are useful but no more. In policy, parsimony is power. Continuous 
analysis of the predictive capability of the overall dashboard, and the contribution 
of each of the indicators, should be carried out. If after a period of time a specifi c 
indicator appears to be adding little value to the overall predictive power of the 
dashboard, it can be safely removed. 
 Create a Federal Offi ce of Opportunity 
 Better data, a clear long-term goal, and a near-term dashboard are all key elements 
of a new policy architecture for social mobility. But there is also a strong case for 
giving social mobility an institutional anchor, in the form of an Offi ce of Opportunity. 
I’ve argued elsewhere for such an institution at a federal level, but there is just as 
strong a case for state or city versions (Reeves  2014 ). The offi ce would be charged 
with producing regular reports on progress in terms of both the long-term goal and 
the shorter-term indicators; for overseeing and advising on data collection; and for 
generating independent advice on the mobility-enhancing potential of various pol-
icy proposals. The offi ce could be established as an executive body, a congressional 
one, or a hybrid. 
 Scott Winship has made a more ambitious institutional proposal, an Opportunity, 
Evidence and Innovation Offi ce (OEIO), based in the White House. His OEIO 
would bring together a number of existing agencies and fund and evaluate programs 
and initiatives that “seek to promote upward mobility” (Winship  2015 , 36). 
 Note that none of these proposals are in themselves about policy: rather they are 
about the generation of reliable data and clear indicators and strong institutional 
grounding for a focus on intergenerational mobility. They amount to a policy  archi-
tecture rather than a policy. Which policies or programs will work toward the goal—
and by association the leading indicators—is a second-order question, and one that 
should be settled empirically. We should be evangelical about the ends but agnostic 
about the means. 
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 The development of key indicators, collection of data, and establishment of techni-
cal bodies lack the glamour and immediacy of new policies or programs. But it is 
partly for that reason that they are more likely to gain crucial bipartisan political 
support. Even if both sides agree there is a problem, there is very little agreement in 
terms of specifi c solutions. Efforts to gain bipartisan support for specifi c policy 
programs are likely to be unsuccessful. But there is space for bipartisanship in the 
creation of an institutional framework designed to track the nation’s progress toward 
greater opportunity, keep the attention of policy-makers on this long-term task, 
drive the collection and dissemination of higher quality data, and dispassionately 
assess initiatives intended to improve rates of intergenerational mobility. 
 Right now, political discussions of opportunity are replete with anecdote and 
soaring speeches about American exceptionalism. But in the end, the restoration of 
opportunity is not a matter of opinion or rhetoric. It is a matter of fact. If we are 
serious about a project to restore opportunity, we need to know when we’ve arrived. 
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